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No ‘No’: On the Crosslinguistic Absence
of a Determiner ‘No’∗
Uli Sauerland
This paper concerns the semantics of determiners. I point out that the currently
dominant generalized quantiﬁers analysis of determiners has certain deﬁciencies. I
then provide an alternative which seems oﬀer some hope not suﬀer from the same
deﬁciencies.
It is generally believed that the semantics of all determiners ﬁts into one
or a limited number general schema. The same assumption is made also for other
categorial classes. This assumption is well motivated, since there must be a gen-
eral mechanism that relates syntactic structures to semantic representations. This
mechanism can be easy and elegant in a straightforward way if the semantics of each
syntactic class is internally uniform, such that for example all transitive verbs, or
all complementizers belong to the same semantic type of things.
The general schema of determiner quantiﬁcation that is most popular these
days is the generalized quantiﬁer analysis. This analysis goes back to at least Mon-
tague (1970) and was developed by Barwise and Cooper (1981) and Keenan and
Stavi (1986) among many others. All modern textbooks of natural language seman-
tics (Larson and Segal 1995, Heim and Kratzer 1998, de Swart 1998) present this
analysis of determiner quantiﬁcation. The basic claim, the general schema, is that
all determiners are two place functions that take two predicates as arguments.
In this paper I want to do the following. In the ﬁrst section, I argue that
the a certain generalized quantiﬁer, the one usually called NO, is not attested in
any natural language, and that what use be analyzed as NO is better analyzed as a
morpho-syntactically composed expression but should semantically as negation plus
an indeﬁnite. As I argue, this observation provides motivation to seek an alternative
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welcome comments though.to the generalized quantiﬁers view of determiner quantiﬁcation. In the second part
of the paper, I propose an alternative to generalized quantiﬁers, that is based on
a diﬀerent syntactic structure of quantiﬁcational DPs and involves quantiﬁcation
over choice functions. For this reason, I introduce the term Cfantiﬁers for these
semantic functions. While the considerations I oﬀer are unfortunately at present
still inconclusive, I hope to show that there is some reason for optimism.
1 Absence of Negative Quantiﬁers
According to the generalized quantiﬁers view of determiners, all determiner mean-
ings are two place functions that take two predicates as their arguments and yield
truth values as their result. In the type-theoretic notation of Montague (1970) ,
generalized quantiﬁers are the functions of type   e,t ,  e,t ,t   . The generalized
quantiﬁers analysis is, as far as I know, descriptively successful: all determiners
of English and as far as I know also all other languages can be assigned the right
interpretation on the generalized quantiﬁer analysis, though it may sometimes be
diﬃcult to ﬁgure out which analysis of a number of candidates is the correct one.
The criticism I develop in this section is, though, that of all the semantically pos-
sible generalized quantiﬁers few are actually attested—I believe at most universal,
existential, and cardinal quantiﬁcation is attested.
For reasons of space I focus on one conceivable generalized quantiﬁer, the
quantiﬁer NO. I want to show that no language has a determiner that means NO.
In particular, I claim that the English word no must be analyzed as not+one by
decomposition into sentential negation NOT together with an existential determiner
∃.
(1) NO(R)(S)=1i ﬀ∀x : R(x) ⇒  S(x)
I don’t address in this paper other expressions that have been sometimes analyzed
as generalized quantiﬁers (Keenan and Stavi 1986). I’m thinking of comparatives
like more than three, partitives like three out of four, and superlatives like most.I
believe that all of these are also semantically decomposed into smaller parts and
that the determiners that occur in the decomposed LF-structure all accord to mygeneralization, but don’t have the space here to justify this assumption.
Consider now the English Quantiﬁer no, which seems an even more likely
candidate that the complex expressions of the previous paragraph for a determiner
since it’s one word in English. As already mentioned, a popular analysis of the
sentence in (2a) is that sketched in (2b) where the meaning of no is the generalized
determiner NO of (1).
(2) a. Andy has no enemies.
b. NO([[enemies]])(λx Andy has x)
An alternative semantic analysis of (2a) is to decompose no into negation and an
indeﬁnite. This is sketched in (3a) and paraphrased in (3b).
(3) a. NOT(∃x ∈ [[enemies]]: Andy has x)
b. ‘It’s not the case that Andy has an enemy’
‘Andy doesn’t have any enemies.’
The truth conditions of (3a) are identical to those of (2b). I argue in the following
sections with evidence from a variety of languages that only the analysis (3a) is
actually possible for sentences with no or their equivalents in other languages. I
show that some languages don’t have a word like the English no, but must express
the meaning by overtly using either negation and indeﬁnite (Japanese and Salish)
or negation and a negative concord item (French, Italian, and Japanese), which I
take to be a morphological variant of an indeﬁnite. I then show evidence from four
languages (Mohawk, Norwegian, German, and English) that seem to have a word
no which shows that in these languages to no can be decomposed into negation and
indeﬁnite, and in at least Mohawk and Norwegian must be. Based on these data I’ll
conclude that the simplest assumption, especially from an acquisition point of view,
is that the determiner no is always decomposed, which means that the generalized
quantiﬁer NO is not attested in any natural language.1.1 Overt Decomposition: Japanese and Salish
In some languages, there’s no candidate for a determiner meaning ‘no’. Japanese
apparently is such a language (Yabushita 1996). The way to express a statement
like ‘No students read that book’ is (4), where negation and an indeﬁnite are used
to capture the English ‘no’.
(4) Sono
that
hon-o
book
yonda
read
gakusei-wa
students
hitori-mo
one-even
inai.
exist-not
‘Students who read that book don’t exist.’ (literally)
‘No students read that book.’
Another way to express ‘No students read that book’ is (5), where again ‘NO’ is
split into ‘not’ and and indeﬁnite.
(5) gakusei-wa
students
sono
that
hon-o
book
yomanakatta
read-not-past
Japanese also has negative concord/polarity words which oﬀer another way to ex-
press the meaning of ‘no’. Such expressions are discussed in the next subsection.
Another language, where the only way of expressing ‘no’ is transparently
decomposed into an indeﬁnite and negation is Salish (Matthewson 1998:49-50) (see
also Matthewson 1998 for the details of the transcription).
(6) a. xwa
neg
kwet
thing
syaqcu-s
wife-his
(Sechelt)
‘His wife didn’t exist.’ (literally)
‘He had no wife.’
b. 7axw
neg
ti
det
ka
hyp
lhalas
boat
7ala
here
7ats (Bella Coola)
‘A boat doesn’t exist here.’ (literally)
‘There’s no boat here.’
1.2 Negative Concord: French, Italian, Japanese, ...
Negative concord words are words that can only cooccur with negation in the same
sentence, and moreover must be in the scope of negation. Negation and the negativeconcord word together have a meaning equivalent to English no. For example in
French and Italian, the words that seem to translate ‘no’ must cooccur with senten-
tial negation when they occur in a sentence (or at least when they occur in object
position). (see Haegeman 1995, Herburger 1998, Ladusaw 1992, Zanuttini 1997,
among many others)
(7) a. Je
I
n’ai
not-have
vu
seen
personne
nobody
(French)
‘I saw nobody.’
b. ∗Je
I
ai
have
vu
seen
personne
nobody
(8) a. Non
Non
o
have
visto
seen
nessuno
nobody
(Italian)
‘I saw nobody.’
b. ∗o
have
visto
seen
nessuno
nobody
One interesting question that has been asked about negative concord is whether the
negative force of sentences like (7a) and (8a) originates with the negation word or
is part of the meaning of the negative concord item. As far as I know, the majority
of the literature on the topic assumes that negation is interpreted in examples like
the above, and that the interpretation of a negative concord word is essentially that
of an indeﬁnite. The strongest argument for this assumption comes from cases that
contain more than one negative concord item. If more than one of the negative
concord item occurs in a sentence as in (9) only one instance of sentential negation
is required to license all of them. Moreover, an interpretation with multiple negation
isn’t available as shown by (9) (Haegeman and Zanuttini 1996:(13)).
(9) Non
No
ho
Ih a v e
mai
never
detto
told
niente
nothing
a
to
nessuno
noone
(Italian)
‘I haven’t ever told anybody anything.’
∗‘I have never told nobody nothing.’If it is true that words like nessuno are to be analyzed as indeﬁnites that
require a special relationship with negation, that means that negative concord lan-
guages also belong to the languages that lack a determiner meaning NO.
1.3 Decomposition I: Mohawk
In the following four sections, I address languages that seem to possess a morpho-
logical determiner meaning NO. My goal is to show that in the ﬁrst two language
actually the determiner must always be analyzed as decomposed, while in the second
two languages the decomposition analysis must be possible, and might be the only
possible one.
Mohawk seems to have a word, yahuhka, that has the generalized quantiﬁer
meaning also attributed to nobody (Baker 1995, 28-29, Baker 1996, 58-60).
(10) Shawatis
John
yahuhka
nobody
to-shako-ka-0
neg-Agr-see-stat
John saw nobody.
However, Baker argues that yahuhka is not a determiner, but decomposed into nega-
tion and an indeﬁnite. I summarize Baker’s argument. First, Yahuhka cannot appear
following the verb unlike other nominal phrases as shown by the contrast between
(11) and (12).
(11) ∗Shawatis
John
to-shako-ka-0
neg-Agr-see-stat
yahuhka
nobody
(12) a. Shawatis
John
akweku
all
wa-shako-kv-’
fact-Agr-see-punc
John saw everyone.
b. Shawatis
John
wa-shako-kv-’
fact-Agr-see-punc
akweku
all
John saw everyone.
Furthermore, Yah is the morpheme for sentential negation.
(13) a. Ter
Peter
yah
not
te-ha-yena-0
neg-Agr-catch-stat
ne
ne
takos
catPeter didn’t catch the cat.
b. Sak
Sak
yah
not
kanusha’
house
te-ho-hninu-0
neg-Agr-buy-stat
Sak didn’t buy a/the house.
And, Uhkak has an existential meaning.
(14) Uhkak
someone
wa-shako-kv-’
fact-Agr-see-punc
He saw somebody.
In fact, yahuhka can be split into yah and uhka (without the ﬁnal /k/ of
uhkak, see discussion by Baker).
(15) yah
not
to-shako-ka-0
neg-Agr-see-stat
uhka
somebody
He didn’t see anybody.
Hence, Baker proposes that yahuhka should really be analyzed a compound of nega-
tion and the indeﬁnite uhka(k). Notice that the ungrammaticality of (11) is only
be explained, if the decomposition is the only possible analysis of yahuhka.I f t h e
generalized quantiﬁer existed as an option, (11) should be grammatical.
1.4 Decomposition II: Norwegian
Norwegian behaves exactly like Mohawk, except that the relation ship between Nor-
wegian ingen (‘no’) and the negation and indeﬁnite morphemes is less transparent
(the following discussion is a summary of Christensen 1986 via Kayne 1998).
The ﬁrst property of ingen that resembles Mohawk is that it cannot occur
following a verb as shown in (16).
(16) a. ∗Jon
John
har
hasn’t
lest
read
ingen
no
romaner.
novels.
b. ∗Dette
This
er
is
en
a
student
student
som
who
leser
reads
ingen
no
romaner.
novels.
There are examples like (17) where ingen seems to be following the verb, but in (17)the verb has moved to C and therefore the base position of the verb might well be
following the ingen phrase.
(17) Jon
John
leser
reads
ingen
no
romaner.
novels.
Secondly, in Norwegian a synonymous, but transparently decomposed way of ex-
pressing (17) is available as illustrated by (18).
(18) John
John
leser
read
ikke
not
noen
any
romaner.
novels
For the examples (16), decomposition of ingen into ikke and noen is the only way to
express the English equivalent in Norwegian.
(19) a. John
John
har
has
ikke
not
lest
read
noen
any
romaner.
novels.
b. Dette
this
er
is
en
a
student
student
som
that
ikke
not
leser
reads
noen
any
romaner.
novels
If negation must occur to the left of the base position of the verb, and ingen can
only occur as the result of some morphological replacement when negation and the
indeﬁnite noen are adjacent, these facts are expected. Again, the explanation of the
ungrammaticality of (16) argues in this analysis that ingen must be decomposed into
negation and an indeﬁnite, and that the generalized quantiﬁer NO is not a possible
meaning of ingen.
1.5 Decomposition III: German
In German the equivalent of English no is kein. Unlike in Mohawk and Norwegian,
kein can appear in essentially any position a DP can occur (see below). However,
there is semantic evidence that the determiner kein (‘no’) can be decomposed into
negation and an indeﬁnite (Bech 1955/1957, Lerner and Sternefeld 1984, Kratzer
1995). Namely, a modal can take scope between negation and the indeﬁnite in
both (20a) and (20b). Furthermore, there’s is a diﬀerence between the plural of
kein in (20a) and the singular in (20b). Namely, the example (20a) with the plural
allows only the interpretation where the modal takes scope between two parts ofthe decomposed kein. The example (20b) with the singular, on the other hand, also
allows an interpretation that can be characterized both as the generalized quantiﬁer
NO taking scope over the modal or as negation and the indeﬁnite part of kein both
taking scope above the modal.
(20) a. weil
since
keine
no
Beispiele
examples
bekannt
known
sein
be
m¨ ussen
must
‘since it’s not necessary that examples are known’
(not   must   some, ∗NO   must, ∗must   NO)
b. weil
since
kein
no
Beispiel
example
bekannt
known
sein
be
muß
must
(not   must   some, NO   must, ∗must   NO)
A second argument for the decomposition analysis is that negation cannot be directly
followed by an indeﬁnite as shown by (21a). (21b) shows that topicalization of the
indeﬁnite makes the cooccurence of negation and an indeﬁnite in the same sentence
possible. This indicates that the sequence nicht ein is morphologically transformed
into kein whenever it occurs.
(21) a.??Dem
The
Hans
John
ist
is
nicht
not
ein
an
Beispiel
example
bekannt.
known.
b. Ein
An
Beispiel
example
ist
is
dem
the
Hans
John
nicht
not
bekannt.
known.
‘John doesn’t know one example.’
Kratzer (1995) observed a second diﬀerence between singular and plural kein in (22).
While plural kein is ungrammatical as the subject of an individual level predicate,
singular kein can occur as the subject of an individual level predicate.
(22) a. ∗weil
since
keine
no
¨ Arzte
doctors
altruistisch
altruistic
sind
are
b. weil
since
kein
no
Arzt
doctors
altruistisch
altruistic
ist
isBased on (20) and (22), Kratzer (1995) claim that while plural kein must be de-
composed in German, singular kein can also be a generalized quantiﬁer. With the
assumption that indeﬁnites must always reconstruct to the narrowest scopal posi-
tion, this assumption explains the contrast in (20). In the plural example, the split
reading is forced, because negation cannot reconstruct while the indeﬁnite must re-
construct below the modal. In the singular example, the decomposition analysis
of kein gives rise to the split reading, while generalized quantiﬁer analysis explains
the second reading available in this example. The contrasts in (22), follows from
Kratzer’s assumption together with the belief that the decomposition analysis is
blocked by the presence of an individual level predicate.
Kratzer’s analysis would provide the ﬁrst evidence that at least in some cases
the generalized quantiﬁer NO is attested. However, an alternative analysis of her
facts is possible, based on the assumption that kein is always decomposed. Namely,
assume that the indeﬁnite part of kein must be interpreted in the lowest position of
its chain only when its plural (cf. Carlson 1977). This predicts the contrast in (20)
straightforwardly, and is not less likely to be true than Kratzer’s assumption that
the indeﬁnite part of decomposed kein must reconstruct regardless of whether it’s
singular or plural. Since reconstruction is blocked with individual level predicates,
the new assumption also explains the contrast in (22). In (22a), the reconstruction
requirement of plural kein conﬂicts with whatever blocks reconstruction in individual
level predicates.
The scope evidence in (20) argues that regardless of number, the German
kein at least can always be decomposed into negation and an indeﬁnite part. In the
plural, this must be the only possible analysis of kein since the split scope is the
only interpretation possible. However, for the singular of kein it might be that both
the generalized quantiﬁer analysis and the decomposition analysis are possible as
Kratzer proposes, or that only the decomposition analysis is possible as we saw in
the previous paragraph.
1.6 Decomposition IV: English
Even in English there’s evidence that the decomposition of no must be assumed in
at least some cases. Johnson (1996) points out that negative quantiﬁers can serve asthe antecedent material for an indeﬁnite in VP-ellipsis. It’s well established that an
elided VP must be identical to an antecedent (Sag 1976, Tancredi 1992). Then the
ﬁrst conjunct in (22) must somehow be able to provide an antecedent of the form
ﬁnd a solution. This is easily explained, if no can decompose into negation and the
indeﬁnite a.
(23) I could ﬁnd no solution, but Holly might  ﬁnd a solution 
Kayne (1998) presents a second, independent argument from English that argues
for a form of decomposition—in his version, overt movement of negative quantiﬁers
to negation. His argument is based on the contrasts in (24).
(24) a. I’m required to work out no solution. (not required a solution)
b. I’m required to work no solution out. (required not solution)
Kayne’s argument relies on the similarity of the contrast in (24) to other extraction
properties of particle verbs. For reasons of space I leave out Kayne’s main argu-
ment. Note however, that (24) show the same split scope as the German example
(20). Namely, (24a) shows that negation and indeﬁnite can take scope in diﬀerent
positions. Hence, the decomposition analysis is also possible in English. In English,
however, there’s no evidence for or against the generalized quantiﬁer analysis of no.
1.7 Section Conclusion
The evidence in this section showed that a whole number of typologically diverse
languages— Japanese, Salish, French, Italian, Mohawk, and Norwegian—simply lack
a determiner with the meaning NO. A way to express the same meaning, however,
available to all these languages was the combination of negation and the indeﬁnite.
For German and English, I showed that the decomposition of no is also possible.
However, the available evidence didn’t allow us to decide whether or not in English
and in the German singular the analysis of no as the generalized quantiﬁer NO is
possible. The easiest assumption would be, however, that universally no language
has a determiner that means what the generalized quantiﬁer ‘NO’ expresses.
The following acquisition consideration supports the assumption that Englishand German also lack the generalized quantiﬁer NO. The consideration is based on
the assumption that children can only rely on positive evidence in the acquisition
process (Crain 1991). However, as I discussed above there’s no evidence available
from either German or English whether the generalized quantiﬁer NO is available.
If one were to postulate NO for German and English, it would hence need to be the
default of children to assume a generalized quantiﬁer analysis of the morpheme no.
But, if that was true, how would children acquire Mohawk and Norwegian? In both
Mohawk and Norwegian a morpheme similar to no occurs, hence the generalized
quantiﬁer analysis of it as NO should be entertained by the children, and some
evidence must have triggered them to reject this analysis. However, the evidence
above that led us to conclude that the generalized quantiﬁer NO is not available in
Mohawk and Norwegian was only negative evidence—namely the ungrammaticality
of (11) and (16). This evidence, however, cannot be available to the child learning
either language, and therefore the assumption that the generalized quantiﬁer analysis
is available in English and German must be wrong.
In sum, no language has a determiner with the meaning of NO. Depending on
the syntactic and morphological structure of a language—especially the word order
of Neg, Verb, and Object—the decomposition of NO is more or less obscured. In
languages where negation on one side of the verb and the object on the other, no
must be transparently decomposed into not and indeﬁnite as we saw in Japanese and
Salish, as well as in the negative concord languages. In Mohawk and Norwegian,
we saw that the morpheme no only surfaces when negation and indeﬁnite object
are adjacent. Finally, German and English seem to allow negation to always mor-
phologically interact with the verb. German, since it is verb ﬁnal with negation on
the left of the VP, is straightforward. In English, negation and the object seem to
separated by the verb, which we would expect to block the insertion of no. Hence
the ﬁnding lends support to the idea that the surface position of the English verb
is not it’s base position (Kayne 1998 and references therein).
What implications does the result have for the semantics of determiners?
First consider what it would imply for the standard semantic theory of determiner
meaning: generalized quantiﬁers. As far as I can see, we would need to postulatea second semantic universal ‘Non-negativity’ akin to the ‘Conservativity’ constraint
of Barwise and Cooper (1981) and Keenan and Stavi (1986). Since this is not an
attractive option, unless the constraint could be argued to follow from something,
I take the result to be motivation to search for alternatives to the Generalized
Quantiﬁers view of determiner quantiﬁcation in the hope they might predict the
restrictions on available determiner quantiﬁers. This is what the rest of the paper
is about.
2 An Alternative to Generalized Quantiﬁers
One major support of the generalized quantiﬁers view of quantiﬁcation is that it ﬁts
very well with the surface syntactic structure of English. Namely, underlying the
generalized quantiﬁers view are structure like (24) where DQ is a quantiﬁcational
determiner, R is the NP-complement of DQ and S is the scope of the Determiner
Phrase headed by DQ.
(25)
IP
   
DP
   
DQ R
S
A structure like (25) can be easily correlated with a semantics of quantiﬁers where
these take two arguments. This are the restrictor R, which is provided by the com-
plement of the Determiner, and the scope S, which is provided by the complement
of the Determiner Phrase.
(26) Q(R)(S) or more explicitly Q(λxR(x))(λyS(y))
For example (27a) has the semantics in (27b): The generalized quantiﬁer NO takes
the two one-place properties “man” and “smoked” as its arguments.
(27) a. No man smoked.
b. NO(man)(smoked)However, the next section points to some evidence that the structures that are
actually interpreted are in some cases quite diﬀerent from the surface syntax of
English. Namely, it seems that a quantiﬁer takes only one argument, which contains
both the restrictor and the scope information of the generalized quantiﬁer analysis.
2.1 Restrictors inside the Scope
There is evidence that the restrictor of a quantiﬁers occurs in a position inside the
scope at LF when a quantiﬁer is A-bar moved.. (Chomsky 1993, Fox 1995, 1999,
Sauerland 1998)
On argument from my own work (Sauerland 1998) in favor of this assumption
is based on VP-ellipsis of constituents containing a trace of quantiﬁer movement. In
English, a VP can often be elided if it means the same as an antecedent. If both the
antecedent and the elided VP contain a trace, as sketched in (28), the possibility of
deletion can be used to test for the content of the trace position.
(28) moved DPa ...
antecedent
  
... tracea ... ... moved DPb ...
elided VP
  
... traceb ...
The expectation of the copy theory is that Ellipsis of a VP containing a trace is
possible exactly if the two trace positions have the same content. An argument of
this type is developed by Sauerland (1998:ch.3) based on paradigms with antecedent
contained deletion like (29), which bear out the expectation in (28). Since In (29),
the antecedent of the elided VP on the surface is the matrix VP visited every town
that .... Since the antecedent containment in (29) must be resolved by quantiﬁer
raising of the matrix object, at LF the antecedent VP is visited t,w h e r et is the
trace left by QR of every town with the adjoined relative clause. The observation in
(29) is that ellipsis is only licensed when the head noun of the DP undergoing QR
and the head noun of the relative clause head are identical.
(29) a. ∗Polly visited every town that’s near the lake that Eric did  visit t .
(Kennedy 1994)
b. Polly visited every town that’s near the town that Eric did  visit t .
The contrast in (29) bears out the prediction of the copy theory—two traces areconsidered identical when their antecedents are. My account of (29) relies on a rep-
resentation like (30) where the trace positions contain material of their antecedents.
This means that the trace of a moved quantiﬁer has content which restricts the
range of the quantiﬁer.
(30) every that’s near the lake Op Eric
elided VP
  
visited lake Polly
antecedent
  
visited town
This result then argues that the syntactic division of restrictor and scope of the
English surface syntax, is not as clear at LF. Hence, the assumption of generalized
quantiﬁer theory that restrictor and scope are the two arguments of a quantiﬁca-
tional head is in doubt.
2.2 Cfantiﬁers
My ﬁrst departure from generalized quantiﬁer theory is the LF-structures. As argue
in the previous section, I assume that the syntactic structure of quantiﬁcation is that
sketched in (31): the Quantiﬁer Q takes as it’s complement a phrase that contains
both the lexical content of the scope and the restrictor, but there is a semantic
relationship between the quantiﬁer and the restrictor.
(31)
MP
 
  
Qx IP
   
[x,R] S
The next question is what the semantic relationship between quantiﬁer and restrictor
is—or, in other words, what the variable x may refer to. Since the interpretation
of [x,R] is the complement of S, which is a predicate, it’s natural to assume that
the meaning of [x,R] serves as the argument of S, and hence is of the type of
individuals. I assume that x is a function applying to the predicate R and resulting
in an individual.
Hence, the semantics of (31) I assume to be that in (32).
(32) Q(λfS(f(R)))The meaning of Q, hence, is that of a function assigning to a predicate of certain
functions a truth value. I’ll use the term Cfantiﬁer for such functions.
(33) A Cfantiﬁer is a function assigning to a predicate of type    e,t ,e ,t  a
truth value.
2.3 Weak Crossover
Quantiﬁcation over functions may seem counterintuitive as an analysis of quantiﬁers
like every. Before spelling out the analysis in more detail, consider a beneﬁt of
this analysis: The following new implication falls out from the assumption that
quantiﬁers don’t quantify over individual. Namely, the so called weak crossover
constraint would be a consequence of this view.
It’s well known that in many cases moved quantiﬁcational expressions cannot
bind pronominals anywhere in their scope. This is the so-called weak crossover
constraint (Wasow 1972).
(34) a.??A relative of hisi is visiting every studenti.
b.??O n eo fh e r i friends was talking to every teacheri.
c.??Which studenti are hisi relatives visiting?
If in all these cases, the lexical material restricting the moved quantiﬁer is interpreted
in the trace position, the dependency between the quantiﬁer and its trace is mediated
by a variable ranging over functions.
(35) ∗Which λf are hisf relatives visiting f(student)
But, the pronoun in (35) would have to be interpreted as a function rather than
an individual. The result we expect to be illformed, since for example the function
in the pronoun position doesn’t have an argument. Therefore, weak crossover is a
corollary of the view that quantiﬁers don’t range over individuals, when they are
binding material from an A-bar position.2.4 Expressiveness of Cfantiﬁers: Easy Case
Now consider the following question: For which determiners is there a Cfantiﬁer
that captures the meaning of the determiner accurately? The result we are aiming
is that for ‘’no” there can be no Cfantiﬁer that captures the meaning of “no” as a
primitive, while at least for “every” and “a” such a cfantiﬁer exists.
Without knowledge of what possible determiners the question of the expres-
siveness of Cfantiﬁers would be hard to decide. However, we can rely on the theory
of generalized quantiﬁers as a guide, since it captures a lot of the determiner mean-
ing that were investigate accurately, it just allowed to many possible determiner
meanings. In fact, there is also systematic relationship of the syntactic structure as-
sumed by generalized quantiﬁer theory, and the structures I’m assuming here. This
makes it easy to compare the expressiveness of the two theories. So, given the more
than adequate descriptive coverage of generalized quantiﬁers, a natural question to
ask is (36). As I show in the following section, (36) represents only the easy case of
the expressiveness comparison.
(36) For which generalized quantiﬁers Q is there a Cfantiﬁer C such that:
Q(R)(S) ↔ C(λfS(f(R)))?
It turns out that it’s easier to ask for which Q a corresponding C doesn’t exist.
For such a Q there must be R1,R 2,S 1 and S2 for which Q yields diﬀerent values
(Q(R1)(S1)  = Q(R2)(S2)), but all Cfantiﬁers C yield the same values. That implies
that (37) holds.
(37) λf.S1(f(R1)) = λf.S2(f(R2))
Since for any x there’s an f with f(R1)=f(R2)=x, (37) implies:
(38) S1 = S2 =: S
If S isn’t constant then R1 = R2 follows, because otherwise there is an f with
S(f(R1))  = S(f(R2)). But, if R1 = R2 then it can’t be that Q(R1)(S)  = Q(R2)(S)
contrary to assumption. Hence, S must be a constant function that is either alwayst r u eo ra l w a y sf a l s e .
The leads to the conclusion that, for a Q with Q(R1)(∅)  = Q(R2)(∅)o ra
Q(R1)(De)  = Q(R2)(De), there is no corresponding cfantiﬁer.
Are such quantiﬁers relevant for linguistic purposes? I think so. Consider
the example in (39): If everybody left, the predicate left is true of every individual.
But, if two boys and only one girl are all the people, (39a) is judged true, while
(39b) is false. Hence, it seems that there are possible generalized quantiﬁers that
cannot be expressed by Cfantiﬁers.
(39) a. Two boys left.
b. Two girls left.
This result is, however, built on assumptions about semantics more simple than the
usual one. Speciﬁcally, presuppositions weren’t considered in the argument.
I follow Heim (1983, 1992) in modelling presuppositions formally using partial
functions. Presupposition failure corresponds to an undeﬁned function. So for
example, the predicate “stop” presupposes that whatever stopped or didn’t stop
was going on in the past. This is expressed by assuming that “stop” only is deﬁned
for two arguments, an individual x and a VP P,i fP(x)h e l da ts o m ep o i n ti nt h e
past.
(40) a. John stopped smoking.
b. [[stopped smoking]](x) is deﬁned only if x has been smoking.
Consider now again the question from above, but under the assumption that the
predicate initiated by λf can be either true, false or undeﬁned for any f:
(41) For which generalized quantiﬁers Q is there a Cfantiﬁer C such that:
Q(R)(S) ↔ C(λfS(f(R)))?
The reasoning as above shows that all Q can be expressed by Cfantiﬁer except for
maybe a Q that yields diﬀerent values for two diﬀerent R’s while S is either the
constantly true or the constantly false predicate. Actually, though even for such aQ, λf.S(f(R)) can diﬀer in whether f is deﬁned for R. For any R1  = R2, there is
an f with f(R1) deﬁned and f(R2) not deﬁned. Hence, at least for all generalized
quantiﬁers Q there is a corresponding Cfantiﬁer C that has the same truth value.
This result shows that we haven’t lost any of the expressiveness of generalized
quantiﬁers by adopting Cfantiﬁers instead. This is not the desired, since the goal
is to loose expressiveness, to loose at least the generalized quantiﬁer NO. The next
section shows, that actually the easy case considered is not the only to consider
when asking whether a Cfantiﬁer captures the meaning of generalized quantiﬁer.
2.5 Expressiveness of Cfantiﬁers: Diﬃcult Case
What is the case of Cfantiﬁers we didn’t consider yet? Since the material that on
the generalized quantiﬁer view is the restrictor occupies a position internal to the
scope, it should also be able to contain a variable bound within the scope. Actually,
such structures have been considered in the literature. One place where something
like Cfantiﬁers have been employed previously is the work of Engdahl (1980) on the
interpretation of questions. In particular, she discusses examples like (42) where the
interrogative phrase contain a bound variable.
(42) Q: Which friend of heri’s did every studenti invite?
A: Mary invited John and Sue invited Bill.
Engdahl (1980) proposes LF-representation in (43) and a semantics involving quan-
tiﬁcation over functions.
(43) which λf did every studenti invite f(friend of heri’s )
See also recent work on existential quantiﬁcation (Reinhart 1994, 1997, Kratzer
1998, and others).
The question is cfantiﬁers can be deﬁned such that structures with a bound
variable in the argument of the choice function receive the right interpretation. First,
consider what the right interpretation is—the interpretation generalized quantiﬁer
theory predicts.(44) a. Every student brought a/two/no book of his.
b. a/two/no λf every studenti brought f(book of hisi)
It seems to be generally the case that the interpretation of such examples with bound
variables is correctly described by a generalized quantiﬁer taking scope below the
binder of the variable. Then the question is, or which Q is there C such that (45)
holds for T, R and S.
(45) T(λx.Q(Rx)(Sx)) = C(λf.T(λx.Sx(Rx)))
I cannot conclusively answer this question at this moment, especially the even for
the case of indeﬁnites recent work by Chierchia (1999) has shown that modiﬁcations
are required. Instead I would like to oﬀer a heuristic.
3 Constructing some Cfantiﬁers
In this section, I approach the question of which generalized quantiﬁers can be
expressed by a cfantiﬁer in a heuristic way. I try to develop a general schema for
deﬁning cfantiﬁers adjusting it to cover as many examples as possible. It turns out
then that on this approach the ﬁrst assumptions about how to deﬁne cfantiﬁers seem
very natural and that then a cfantiﬁer expressing NO turns out to not deﬁnable.
The general schema for deﬁning Cfantiﬁers that I assume is a reduction to
a predicate of sets D, which has to be intuitive. I assume that every cfantiﬁer is
related to a D by the formula in (46). Furthermore, for the C expressing a determiner
Det, D has to be the intuitive set-predicate correlate of Det: D for the existential
determiner “a” should be the predicate “non-empty”, D for cardinal determiners
“n-many” should be the predicate “n-many elements”. I leave open for now what
D should be for the universal “every”.
(46) C(P)=∃M ⊂ P:(D(M)a n dM fulﬁlls certain requirements)
In the schema (46), I assume that the additional requirements on M, whatever their
nature maybe, don’t vary with the Cfantiﬁer C, but are the same for all Cfantiﬁers
we deﬁne.3.1 An Existential Cfantiﬁer
Is there a Cfantiﬁer that can capture existential quantiﬁcation? Or more formally:
Is there Cfantiﬁer C with (47) for any R, S and T?
(47) T(λx.∃(Rx)(Sx)) = C(λf.T(λx.Sx(Rx)))
If we assume that C involves existential quantiﬁcation, maybe over some set M
which is a subset of the total domain of Cfantiﬁers, it follows that this subset must
be that of choice functions. Namely, (48a) entails (48b).
(48) a. ∀R,S:(∃f : S(f(R)) →∃ x ∈ R:S(x))
b. ∀R:∀f ∈ C:∀R:f(R) ∈ R
This is in fact Engdahl’s (1980) analysis of questions: existential quantiﬁcation over
choice functions. Consider the example in (49a), which Engdahl analyzes as in (49b).
(49) a. Which friend of heri’s did every studenti invite?
b. ∃ λf C+wh did every studenti invite f(friend of heri’s)
A choice function is a function which assigns to sets elements thereof. The concept
is deﬁned in (50).
(50) f is a Choice Function iﬀ. ∀X ∈ Domain(f):f(X) ∈ X
For illustration, consider example (49) in the situation (51), where only the marked
people have received an invitation.
(51)
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In this situation, (49) is a felicitous question and could be answered Sue invited
Bill and Mary invited John. This is explained by the existence of a choice function
that satisﬁes the predicate in (52), which is the scope of the quantiﬁcation in (49b).
Namely, the choice function that from every set of friends of someone picks the one
that is marked in (51).
(52) λf C+wh did every studenti invite f(friend of heri’s)
Choice functions have also been used for wide scope existentials (Reinhart
1994 and others). (53) gives one illustration of this analysis.
(53) a. Mary will leave if a certain philosopher comes.
b. ∃λf Mary will leave if f(a certain philosopher) comes.
3.2 Cardinal Cfantiﬁers
I assume with Diesing (1992) and others that English cardinal expressions can be
indeﬁnites, but also quantiﬁcational. This explains that they can occur in environ-
ments limited to indeﬁnites as in (54a), but also take distributive wide scope as in
(54b).
(54) a. There are three women in the room.
b. A diﬀerent man greeted three women.
With cardinal quantiﬁers, however, there are problems assuming quantiﬁcation over
all choice functions. Here I assume that cardinals quantiﬁers are expressed reduced
to the cardinal predicate “n-many element” for the appropriate n.
Namely, assuming quantiﬁcation over all choice functions incorrectly predicts
(55a) to be true in the situation sketched in (56).
(55) a. Every studenti brought two books of hisi.
b.

two λf every studenti brought [f, books of hisi](56)
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The scope of (55b) is satisﬁed by the two distinct choice functions f and g deﬁned
as follows. Hence, (55b) is true in situation (56), while intuitively (55a) is false.
(57) a. f: {b o o k so fM a r y }  → A
{b o o k so fJ o h n }  → C
b. g: {b o o k so fM a r y }  → A
{b o o k so fJ o h n }  → D
At this point, a further restriction on the set of choice functions D applies to becomes
necessary. It seems fairly clear, that what is going wrong in (57) is that the choice
function f and g both pick the element A from the set of books of Mary.
3.3 Pointwise Diﬀerent Choice Functions
As we saw, if cardinal quantiﬁers are requirements on the number of elements of a
set of choice functions, this set must usually be a true subset of the set of all choice
functions satisfying the complement of the cardinal quantiﬁer.
I propose the modiﬁcation of the choice function approach in (58).
(58) Proposal: Quantiﬁcational determiners range over pointwise diﬀerent
choice functions.
Two choice functions are pointwise diﬀerent if they choose diﬀerent elements for
every set that is in the domain of both of them. This is stated in (59).
(59) f and g are pointwise diﬀerent iﬀ.
∀ x ∈ Domain(f) ∩ Domain(g):f(x)  = g(x)This restriction brings about another shift: the choice functions the existen-
tial cfantiﬁer quantiﬁes over could have all been total choice functions: ones that are
deﬁned for any nonempty set. But, note that two global choice functions can never
be pointwise diﬀerent, because for any singleton in their domain that must yield
the same value. Hence, now we are committed to partial choice functions. This,
however, doesn’t aﬀect the earlier argument since for the truth of the predicate the
Cfantiﬁer applies to only the value of the choice function for those sets that it’s
presupposed that the choice function is deﬁned for matters.
The proposal avoids the problem noted above. The problematic f and g of
(57) are not pointwise diﬀerent. They choose the same element from the set of books
of Mary.
(60) a. f: {b o o k so fM a r y }  → A
{b o o k so fJ o h n }  → C
b. g: {b o o k so fM a r y }  → A
{b o o k so fJ o h n }  → D
3.3.1 The PPD-set
For two a set of two pointwise diﬀerent choice functions that satisfy the scope is
required. For other cardinal quantiﬁers a set of choice functions must satisfy the
scope each two of which are pointwise diﬀerent.
(61) a. Every student brought three books of his.
b. three λf every student brought [f, books of hisi]
The set of choice functions required must have the property of being pairwise point-
wise diﬀerent. The following abbreviation is useful:
(62) PPD(S) is true iﬀ. S is a set of choice functions with
∀f,g ∈ S : f,g are pointwise diﬀerent or f = g3.4 Quantiﬁcation over the PPD-set
If quantiﬁcation is restricted to a PPD-set, how is the PPD provided. One option
to consider is that the PPD-set is given by context. This assumption runs into
problems: Consider example (63a) in the situation (51), where it was intuitively
true.
(63) a. Every studenti invited a friend of heri’s.
b. ∃λf every studenti invited f(friend of heri’s)
If quantiﬁcation over choice functions was restricted to a contextually salient PPD-
set, the truth of (63a) actually depends on the PPD-set. Since there’s only one f
that satisﬁes the scope of (63b), only if this f was always in the relevant PPD-set,
would (63a) be predicted true regardless of the context. But, if the f  in (64) is
in the contextually relevant PPD-set, the only f satisfying the scope of (63b) was
excluded, since the f  in (64) is not pointwise diﬀerent with f with it.
(64) f :
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

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
Hence, in a context where f  is contextually relevant, (63) should be false and (65)
should be true.
(65) It’s not true that every studenti invited a friend of heri’s.
Therefore, the PPD-set cannot be contextually given. I suggest that the PPD set is
existentially quantiﬁed over, like other implicit arguments are. For cardinal quanti-
ﬁers this amounts to the lexical entry in (66):
(66) [[more than n]](S) is true iﬀ. ∃F (PPD(F) and there are more than nf
such that S(f)a n df ∈ F)3.5 Absence of Negative Quantiﬁers
The reasoning so far, has lead us to the deﬁnition schema in (67), where D is
determined as discussed above. We can now argue that the schema in (67) doesn’t
allow the deﬁnition of a Cfantiﬁer expressing NO.
(67) C(P)=1i ﬀ∃M:(D(M ∩ P)a n dM is a PPD set of choice functions
(more restrictions possible))
Assume we’re to deﬁne a cfantiﬁer for ‘no’ following schema (67). Then consider
again the situation with two students M and J and four books A, B, C, D (two
each) where each student brought one of his book, namely Mary brought A, and
John brought C.
(68)
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In this situation, consider the following examples with an existential quantiﬁer in
(69), a cardinal quantiﬁer in (70), and “no” in (71). The result we want is that (69)
is true, while (70) and (71) are false.
(69) a. Every student brought a book of his.—TRUE
b. a λf every studenti brought f(book of hisi)
(70) a. Every student brought two books of his.—FALSE
b. two λf every studenti brought f(books of hisi)
(71) a. Every student brought no books of his.—FALSE
b. no λf every studenti brought f(books of hisi)
Let’s use BM to stand for the set of books of Mary and BJ to stand for the set of
books of John. Consider the two PPD-sets in (72).(72) a. M1 = {{ BM,A , BJ,C },{ BM,B , BJ,D }}
b. M2 = {{ BM,A , BJ,D },{ BM,B , BJ,C }}
At least these two PPD-sets must be amongst the possible Values for M in the
schema (67) since the truth of (70) could be due to any of the choice functions in
M1 ∪ M2. In the situation we’re considering, the scope of the cfantiﬁers in (69),
(70), and (71) is true of only one of the four choice functions in M1 ∪ M2,n a m e l y
{ BM,A , BJ,C }, which is an element of M1. Clearly for the situation could be
modiﬁed such that any other choice function in M1 ∪M2 was the one satisfying the
scope. Hence, both of these sets must be considered.
‘No’ cannot be expressed following the above schema. Consider any set pred-
icate D in schema (67) that leads to the result that “no” is false in the situation
we’re considering. It would be required that D is false of both M1∩P and M2∩P in
(71). This means D must be false of both the empty set and the singleton set con-
taining { BM,A , BJ,C }. Moreover, this consideration holds regardless of which
of the four choice functions in (72) actually is the one satisfying the scope of the
cfantiﬁer. Hence, D must be false of any other singleton set. We could go on to
show that D must actually be false of any set of choice functions. However, there
are situations where (71) is true. Then, the same D should be true of either M1∩P
or M2 ∩ P. In fact, this sets will both be the empty set in this situation. Clearly,
it’s impossible that D sometimes be true and sometimes be false of the same set.
Therefore, “no” cannot be expressed by a quantiﬁer following the schema (67).
This is the desired result. “No” cannot be captured as a determiner meaning
by the given theory of possible determiner meanings. Hence, ‘No’ can only be
expressed by decomposition into negation that takes scope above the existential
quantiﬁer.
4 Conclusion
This paper ﬁrst argued for a new observation, namely that Negative Quantiﬁers
(speciﬁcally “no”) must be composed out of negation and an indeﬁnite. This is
not expected on the standard theory of possible determiner meanings: generalized
quantiﬁer theory.I then pursued an alternative theory of possible determiner meanings, based
on a diﬀerent syntactic structure of quantiﬁcation at LF. I claimed Quantiﬁcation
ranges over complicated objects (functions). Since there are in intuitive sense more
functions than there are individuals, the theory of quantiﬁers becomes more diﬃ-
cult. The argument I developed, showed that Existentials must be allowed over a
big subset of these functions, but for cardinals smaller subsets must be considered
separately. This lead to the assumption that there is existential quantiﬁcation over
the small subset under consideration in the schema deﬁning possible quantiﬁers. I
then showed that negative quantiﬁcation cannot be expressed in this form because
of the existential quantiﬁer over subsets. This leads to the result that decomposi-
tion of negative quantiﬁers into negation and an indeﬁnite part is the only way the
meaning of ‘no’ can arise.
The character of the argument, which is still incomplete as I noted, relies
on comparison of the expressiveness generalized quantiﬁers and the new type of
quantiﬁers, cfantiﬁers, which I deﬁne above. I try to argue that only certain gen-
eralized quantiﬁers can be expressed by cfantiﬁers. However, a little consideration
shows that there are also many cfantiﬁers that cannot be expressed by generalized
quantiﬁers. The actually attested quantiﬁers are those that can be expressed by a
generalized quantiﬁer and equivalently by a cfantiﬁer. This indicates that both gen-
eralized quantiﬁers and cfantiﬁers play a role. Since cfantiﬁers match the syntactic
LF-structure of quantiﬁcation, I assume that they’re the primary semantic device of
quantiﬁcation. Generalized quantiﬁers, however, might well play a role in processing
systems. Then quantiﬁcational determiners are required to be expressible as both
generalized quantiﬁers and cfantiﬁers. Since this is not the case for “no” this gives
the desired result.
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